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I. INTRODUCTION 
Harold Berman is one of the most important legal scholars of recent 
decades, I think, and I want to begin with an observation from Berman’s 
intriguing book Law and Revolution.1  Berman contends that the 
Western legal tradition, the tradition that you and I inhabit, originated in 
the eleventh century with the so-called Papal Revolution.2  Berman also 
argues that this tradition has proven to be remarkably resilient: it has 
survived and adapted itself to a series of wrenching revolutions including 
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 1. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
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the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, and the Communist 
Revolution.3  But Berman suggests, or at least he suggested some twenty 
years ago when Law and Revolution was first published, that the tradition 
may at long last have reached its terminus.4
“That the Western legal tradition, like Western civilization as a whole, 
is undergoing in the twentieth century a crisis greater than it has ever 
known before is not something that can be proved scientifically,” 
Berman wrote.5  “It is something that is known, ultimately, by intuition.  
I can only testify, so to speak, that I sense that we are in the midst of an 
unprecedented crisis of legal values and of legal thought, in which our 
entire legal tradition is being challenged . . . .”6  Berman went on to 
assert that “the historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being 
washed away in the twentieth century, and the tradition itself is threatened 
with collapse.”7
A quarter-century later, Berman’s report of law’s impending demise 
may seem greatly exaggerated.  Law does not seem to have collapsed; 
indeed, there seems to be a good deal of life left in the old corpus juris.  
Though Berman himself was surely no “Crit,” perhaps he was 
temporarily infected by the fever of the times in which Critical Legal 
Studies diagnosed⎯or, according to some, constituted⎯a kind of deep-
seated malaise in law and legal thought.8
Whatever the influences may have been, though, Berman’s warning 
was only one of many in a long line of such forecasts soberly⎯or, often, 
sanguinely⎯predicting that law as we know it cannot long endure. 
II. APOCALYPSE NOW, OR NEVER? 
In his seminal essay on “The Path of the Law,” Holmes prognosticated 
that traditional law-talk with its quaintly moralistic vocabulary, its 
invoking and interpreting of formal-sounding doctrines, and its citing 
and parsing and distinguishing of precedents would surely soon give 
way to a bold new discourse self-consciously based on policy and 
economics.9  “For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may 
be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of 
statistics and the master of economics.”10  This imminent transformation 
 3. See id. at 2, 18-19, 50. 
 4. See id. at 33-34. 
 5. Id. at 33. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 39. 
 8. For an overview of the movement, see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL 
MOVEMENTS 106-27 (1995). 
 9. See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 10. Id. at 469. 
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was “the inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of 
spontaneous growth.”11
A generation or two later, Roscoe Pound and then the so-called Legal 
Realists wrote in a similar spirit: formalistic or “mechanical” legal reasoning 
was empty, and was destined to be replaced by a more policy-oriented 
law expressly built around the learning of the social sciences.  In this 
vein, Felix Cohen described the “Restatement” project as “the last long-
drawn-out gasp of a dying tradition.”12
Jumping forward in time to the 1980s, we might look not to the Crits, 
who were perhaps predisposed to be gloomy, but to one of their favorite 
and more mainstream whipping boys.  In a colorful little book called 
Reconstructing American Law, Bruce Ackerman argued that conventional 
legal discourse is archaic and unsustainable, and he advocated a new 
“constructivist” law-talk that would openly draw upon social science 
and computer technology.13  And, of course, Judge Posner increasingly 
describes “law” as it works today and, if Berman is right, as it has worked 
for approximately the last millennium, not as a venerable tradition to be 
celebrated for its deep indwelling rationality, but rather as an archaic 
discourse that must be “overcome.”14
A couple of clarifications are in order here.  First, I do not believe that 
any of these thinkers doubted that some form of rule-making and rule-
following are and will continue to be part of any collective human 
enterprise.  They were talking, I think, about the distinctive Western 
legal tradition—one that displays features that Berman carefully 
enumerated,15 including the belief that the law has a “capacity for 
growth over generations and centuries,” and that this growth occurs in 
accordance with “an internal logic” that “reflects an inner necessity.”16  
This conception of law underlies the patterns of distinctively lawyerly 
argument that Holmes thought quaint and that outsiders may find, as 
Cass Sunstein says, “weird or exotic.”17  It is that kind of law that the 
prophets thought to be doomed. 
 11. Id. at 468. 
 12. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 833 (1935). 
 13. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-104 (1984). 
 14. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995). 
 15. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 7-10. 
 16. Id. at 9. 
 17. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 13-14 (1996).  
  




Second, temperaments differ here.  Some people find the apocalyptic 
sensibility to be something entirely foreign and almost incomprehensible.  I 
myself am a pretty tame and unimaginative fellow, and so usually I find 
myself in that quiescent mood.  But I am also acquainted with the 
apocalyptic mentality, I believe, through both first person and third person 
experience.  In my undergraduate days, my favorite book was Sorokin’s 
The Crisis of Our Age.18  And I fondly recall in this respect a friend and 
former colleague, of a “post-modern” bent and passionate disposition, 
who would regularly burst into my office, Kramer-like, but with an air of 
desperation.  “It just can’t go on like this!” he would moan; I understood 
“it” to refer to the legal enterprise as we currently teach and practice it. 
From our vantage point, though, all of these doleful or gladsome 
predictions of law’s demise may seem to be grossly in error.  Indeed, in 
the complacent jurisprudential lull we currently occupy, they may even 
seem a bit deranged.  Far from dying out, law seems in the second half 
of the last century to have expanded its jurisdiction, as more and more 
areas of life have been brought under the sway of “due process” or “rule 
of law” or legalistic regulations of various sorts.  Paul Campos argues 
that we presently suffer not from the withering away of law but rather 
from an excessive, obsessive legalism that he calls “jurismania.”19  And 
of course we are currently working to transport our legalistic commitments 
and institutions throughout the world, most conspicuously to the Middle 
East. 
Nor does the nature of legal reasoning seem to have changed 
dramatically.  To be sure, we in the academy⎯and a few select judges⎯are 
probably more overtly attentive to policy, and particularly to economics, 
than our predecessors seem to have been.  However, by and large, 
lawyers and judges argue and justify in pretty much the same forms that 
they have been using for generations.20
Thus, historian and law professor Norman Cantor observes that “[a] 
London barrister of 1540, quick-frozen and revived in New York today, 
would only need a year’s brush-up course at NYU School of Law to 
begin civil practice as a partner in a midtown or Wall Street corporate-
“For lawyers,” to quote E.P.Thompson, writing in 1975 of what he calls “the 
greatest of all legal fictions,” “the law itself evolves, from case to case, by its 
own impartial logic, true only to its own integrity . . . .”  There is, of course, a 
sense in which nobody really believes this any more, but it remains the case 
that much legal behavior proceeds on the assumption that the law is like that.  
For example, all legal argument in court makes this assumption.” 
A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 10 (1995) (quoting E.P. 
THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 250 (1975)). 
 18. PITIRIM A. SOROKIN, THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE (1941). 
 19. See PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW (1998). 
 20. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 241-42 (1997). 
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law firm.”21  Even Richard Posner concedes as much.  He glumly observes 
that 
Most lawyers, judges, and law professors still believe that demonstrably correct 
rather than merely plausible or reasonable answers to most legal questions, even 
very difficult and contentious ones, can be found—and it is imperative that they 
be found—by reasoning from authoritative texts, either legislative enactments 
(including constitutions) or judicial decisions, and therefore without recourse to 
the theories, data, insights, or empirical methods of the social sciences . . . .22
So the prophets of law’s demise seem to have been woefully mistaken, 
thus far anyway.  And yet, isn’t there something at least intriguing about 
the fact of these recurring jeremiads?  Predictions of the end of course 
are not unusual: we are all familiar with the street prophet who carries a 
sign proclaiming “Repent!  The end is near!”  But usually such doomsayers 
are regarded as marginal and pathetic characters.  In law, by contrast, 
confident predictions declaring that “law cannot go on this way” have 
come not just from marginal types, or even radical Crits, but from the 
central and revered thinkers of the profession.  Holmes, Felix Cohen, 
Bruce Ackerman, Richard Posner, Harold Berman—these are hardly 
outcasts or reprobates in the legal community.  On the contrary, they are 
among its respected leaders and thinkers. 
So, what are we to make of this recurring spectacle in which luminaries 
of the enterprise repeatedly declare that the enterprise as traditionally 
understood and practiced is near defunct and unable to continue on its 
current footing—and these apocalyptic pronouncements over and over 
again turn out to be mistaken, or at least seriously premature?  If there is 
nothing essentially wrong in a discipline, then it is all the more paradoxical 
if many of its central figures repeatedly announce that there is something 
essentially wrong or unsustainable. 
So once again, what should we make of this situation?  Reflecting on 
that question might just tell us a good deal about what it is like to live, in 
the law, or even in the Western neighborhood of the world, today. 
III. THE PUZZLE OF INDETERMINACY 
One way to approach the question is by reviewing what we might call 
the indeterminacy problem—a problem, or at least a perceived one, that 
 21. NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 192 (1997). 
 22. POSNER, supra note 14, at 20. 




loomed over much of the more subversive or anguished jurisprudential 
thinking of the last century.  Let me hasten to say that I do not believe, 
as some readers seem to have supposed,23 that indeterminacy is the 
central “Law’s Quandary” that I discussed in a recent book with that 
title.24  However, we can approach that quandary by thinking back about 
the debate over indeterminacy. 
We might start with another quotation from Holmes’s enormously 
influential “Path of the Law” lecture.25  “You can give any conclusion a 
logical form,” Holmes told his audience.26  “You can always imply a 
condition in a contract.  But why do you imply it?”27  Here is Holmes’s 
answer: “Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth 
and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate 
and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of 
the whole proceeding.”28  The statement bears close examination because it 
foreshadows one of the central debates, and directions, of twentieth-
century legal thinking. 
“You can give any conclusion a logical form.”29  Holmes seems to say 
here that the doctrines and rules of the law will support arguments 
justifying either of contrary conclusions in particular cases.  The lawyer 
and judge will say that they reached their conclusion because the law so 
required, but in fact the law would with approximately equal plausibility 
have supported the opposite conclusion if they had been inclined to give 
it.  So the law is indeterminate. 
As we know, Legal Realists like Herman Oliphant, Jerome Frank, and 
Joseph Hutcheson elaborated in their different ways on this indeterminacy 
claim.30  And a couple of generations later, the Crits again asserted 
claims of radical indeterminacy in law, this time often with the help (or 
the burden) of fancy Continental theorists like Derrida.31  Sometimes the 
indeterminacy claim was pushed to almost absurd extremes, as in the 
argument that the provision in the Constitution requiring that the 
 23. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Law’s Quest for Objectivity, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 711 (2006). 
 24. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004). 
 25. Holmes, supra note 9. 
 26. Id. at 466. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. (emphasis added). 
 30. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Anchor Books 1963) 
(1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” 
in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare 
Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928). 
 31. See MINDA, supra note 8, at 117-18. 
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President be thirty-five just might mean that the President could be a 
teenager so long as he or she did not have acne.32
Defenders of law naturally saw the indeterminacy claim as subversive, 
because if law were anywhere near as indeterminate as critics suggested, 
then the elaborate (and lucrative) argumentation of lawyers and the 
solemn pronouncements of judges might plausibly be regarded as a sort 
of gigantic fraud on the public.  But is law so indeterminate?  At least on 
first inspection, defenders seemingly had a strong empirical case that it 
is not. 
To be sure, academic lawyers can always spin out legal arguments for 
contrary conclusions.  And ordinary lawyers can do this as well or even 
better than we academic lawyers can.  So in every litigated case that 
lingers on the docket for more than a moment, you can find motions 
supported and opposed by legal-looking arguments set forth in legal 
briefs mustering rules and authorities for diametrically opposed conclusions.  
From a distance, it certainly looks as if legal reasoning can be used to 
support contrary conclusions in most cases.  The critics seem to have a 
point. 
But that criticism is superficial, law’s defenders respond.  It is true 
that in most cases, arguments for contrary conclusions can be offered.  
And those arguments usually cannot be shown to be demonstrably and 
formally incorrect in the way that, say, a student’s computation in a math 
class can be shown to be faulty.  Even so, experienced lawyers and judges 
know that some of these arguments will be persuasive; other arguments, 
by contrast, will quickly be recognized as, well, just not the sort of 
argument that a normally constituted judge will actually find acceptable.  
So while legal reasoning might look indeterminate in the abstract, the 
abstract is not what counts.  Legal reasoning, rather, is an embodied 
“craft” in which lawyers and judges are initiated and apprenticed and 
trained;33 it is a matter of “knowing how,” not merely “knowing that.”34  
Its practitioners are “law-conditioned,” as Karl Llewellyn put it; they see 
through “law-spectacles.”35  Once you understand that, you can appreciate 
 32. See Anthony D’Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 150 
n.11 (1990) (quoting Kenney Hegland, Goodbye to 2525, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 128, 129 
(1990)). 
 33. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 109-62, 295 (1993); 
Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
 34. See Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 
253 (1996). 
 35. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19 (1960). 




that there is in reality much more determinacy in law than meets the 
uninitiated (or the perversely inclined) eye. 
The fact that most cases are not appealed⎯because the lawyers 
understand that appeal would be pointless⎯and that most cases that are 
appealed are decided by unanimous benches is said to show that law is 
tolerably determinate despite the possibility of making opposing legal 
arguments.36  As Karl Llewellyn put it in his more mature stage, even 
appellate cases are “reckonable . . . far beyond what any sane man has 
any business expecting from a machinery devoted to settling disputes 
self-selected for their toughness.”37
Suppose this counterargument is convincing: has the indeterminacy 
worry been vanquished?  Yes and no.  Perhaps law is sufficiently predictable 
for practical human purposes.  But the basic problem is that even if legal 
decisions are tolerably determinate and predictable, that determinacy 
might derive from something other than the legal reasoning offered in 
support of the decisions.  Take an example: it might be that (a) 
critically-minded theorists can show that in many or most abortion 
cases, constitutional “privacy” doctrines can be arranged to support 
contrary outcomes, but also that (b) political scientists can show that the 
votes of individual justices can be reliably predicted based on the 
justices’ political affiliation, religion, and so forth.  Because experienced 
lawyers are at least intuitively sensitive to these non-doctrinal factors, 
they are relatively good at predicting how such cases will be decided.  In 
that case, it would seem to follow both (a) that the legal doctrine and 
reasoning are seriously indeterminate even though (b) the actual 
decisions in abortion cases (the results) are largely predictable. 
Let me offer a homespun analogy, somewhat overstated to make the 
point.  You have just recently moved to the Big City, and you find that 
in attempting to navigate its tangled streets, you are constantly getting 
lost.  But Uncle Albert, who has lived in the City all his life, explains 
that you can always know which way to go if you just follow a few 
simple rules—what he calls “the rules of directional driving.”  “I always 
follow these rules,” he explains, “and I never get lost.”  This sounds 
hopeful, so you ask what the rules are, and Uncle Albert explains that 
there are just three rules: 
 
 Rule A: When you come to an intersection, turn left. 
 Rule B: When you come to an intersection, go straight. 
 Rule C: When you come to an intersection, turn right. 
 
 36. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 38-39 (1992). 
 37. LLEWELLYN, supra note 35, at 4. 
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This recitation of the rules leaves you a bit befuddled, but Uncle 
Albert offers to help by giving you a navigation lesson.  “Watch how I 
do it,” he says, getting into the car.  So you climb in, and he chauffeurs 
you around the city.  At a particular intersection, he turns left, and you 
ask, “Why did you do that?”  “Rule A, of course,” he explains.  At other 
junctures he goes straight or turns right, citing Rules B and C.  “Like I 
said, just follow the rules.  You’ll never go wrong.” 
“But just now, at that corner we just passed, Rule A seemed just as 
applicable,” you protest.  “Rule B did too.  So how did you know which 
rule to follow?”  It is true that driving, for Uncle Albert, seems to be a 
determinate, predictable activity—one with a lot of what Llewellyn 
called “guidesomeness” and “reckonability.”38  Uncle Albert does in fact 
seem to know where to go.  And it is true that he can cite a supporting 
rule for every decision he makes.  But it does not seem that the rules are 
doing the guiding. 
When you offer these reservations, Albert might try to defend his rule-
following account with a bit of sophistication.  “Well, of course, it’s not 
enough just to memorize the rules,” he might say, imitating law professors 
in first-year classes.  “You need to know how to use them.  You need to 
get the ‘feel’ of them.”  Perhaps he adds, “It’s a matter not so much of 
‘knowing that’ but of ‘knowing how.’  It’s a craft, not just a purely 
mechanical process.  As you get used to driving around the City under 
the rules, you’ll figure out how to use them.” 
In a sense Albert is right, and your own driving probably will become 
more determinate⎯more “guidesome” or “reckonable”⎯as your familiarity 
with the City grows.  Eventually you will understand that although in the 
abstract you could invoke Rule A at the corner of Fourth and Main when 
you are on your way home from work, that would be wrong.  In that 
context, the me-going-home-from-work context, the Fourth and Main 
intersection just is not a Rule A type of place; it is pretty obviously a 
Rule C corner.  So the rules work after all.  Except that . . . it seems clear 
that it is your familiarity with the city⎯your “Situation Sense” or “horse 
sense,” to borrow again from Llewellyn⎯that is actually doing the work 
and providing the determinacy,39 not the rules. 
Of course, this is a simplified and exaggerated example.  But in many 
respects, the practice of law, in which lawyers provide respectable-
 38. Id. at 3-6, 41. 
 39. Id. at 121. 




looking legal arguments for opposite conclusions but savvy lawyers 
know which arguments are acceptable and which are not, may seem to 
present a spectacle very much like Uncle Albert’s “rules of directional 
driving.” 
IV. TWO-FACED LAW 
This, in any case, is what Holmes seemed to suggest and what many 
of his descendants have believed.  Thus, we finally come back to the 
second part of the quotation from Holmes provided earlier.  If it is true 
that “you always can imply a condition in a contract,” then the next 
question is, as Holmes said, “why do you imply it?”40  If the formal rules 
and doctrines allow you to draw either conclusion and thus in themselves 
and in the abstract appear to be indeterminate, but if something else 
nonetheless provides substantial determinacy, then what is that something 
else? 
Holmes gave the answer that so many over the last century have 
embraced: “Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative 
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds . . . .”41  Holmes’s 
suggestion ushered in a century of “law-and” in which legal discourse is 
thought to be supported by some other discipline or form of decisionmaking, 
and this other discourse (whatever follows the “and”) in reality does 
most of the real work of making decisions.  Probably the most conspicuous 
candidate for the something else, as Holmes himself anticipated, has 
been economics: underlying the formalistic facade of legal reasoning lies 
a series of complex economic calculations aiming at the efficient use of 
resources.  But there are other candidates: moral philosophy, as Ronald 
Dworkin urges,42 or the eclectic mix of elements that various theorists 
try to bring together and dignify under the heading of “pragmatism.”43
Some such “law-and” understanding has come to be presupposed in 
much or even most of modern legal thought, at least in its self-conscious 
moods.  So law has two levels, or two faces.  At one level there is 
economics, or policy analysis, or moral philosophy, or whatever it is that 
actually drives legal decisions and gives them determinacy and rationality.  
At another, more visible level, there are the official legal reasons and 
justifications in which lawyers and judges dress up their views for public 
presentation.  So as Grant Gilmore observed some years ago (with a bit 
of hyperbole): “For two or three generations past it has been the merest 
 40. Holmes, supra note 9, at 466. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 43. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY 3-
4 (2002). 
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truism, in much American legal writing, that the doctrine which may be 
found enshrined in case report and treatise is neither important nor 
relevant.”44  More recently, but in the same spirit, Jed Rubenfeld has 
advocated “jettison[ing] the whole enterprise of taking constitutional 
doctrine seriously” because the doctrine is a manipulable cover for 
political purposes, so that “the only kind of question really worth asking 
is whether the agenda pursued by a particular Court” is attractive.45
As I have said, this understanding of law as two-faced has become so 
familiar that it seems pretty innocuous.  Even as I describe it, I can see 
some of you suppressing yawns.  And yet, if we force ourselves to 
assume a more detached perspective, I think this account of law comes 
to seem quite fantastic. 
Just on a descriptive or explanatory level, two-faced accounts make 
garden-variety “conspiracy theories” look like the epitome of moderate 
good sense.  These accounts ask us to believe, basically, that hundreds of 
thousands of lawyers and judges, coming from a large variety of backgrounds 
and trained at a large variety of institutions, have learned to make legal 
decisions on the basis of one kind of calculus while expressing their 
views in a significantly different kind of reasoning.  The lawyers and 
judges behave like lawyers and judges in public, while at some private 
level they are really thinking like economists or moral philosophers.  
Seriously, how believable is this picture? 
The plausibility of the two-level view is further challenged by the fact 
that most lawyers and judges have not been trained, at least beyond a 
highly superficial level, to do the kind of economic or philosophical 
reasoning that supposedly informs their decisions.  So if presented with 
an examination going beyond the barest rudiments of economics or 
moral philosophy, most of them⎯of us⎯would flunk miserably.  If you, 
like me, lack graduate training in economics, I challenge you to try to 
read some of the more sophisticated law and economics literature.  I 
predict that you will find it almost wholly incomprehensible.  So then, 
how can we be making our decisions on the basis of reasoning we do not 
even know how to perform? 
Holmes proposed an answer that “law-and” theorists have sometimes 
repeated.  Lawyers and judges may not do the policy or philosophical 
 44. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 13 (1977). 
 45. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 
1177-78 (2002). 




analyses consciously, but rather subconsciously: they act on the basis of 
“inarticulate and unconscious” judgments.46  In a similar vein, Richard 
Posner asserts that “legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward 
efficiency” and that “[a]lthough few judicial opinions contain explicit 
references to economic concepts, often the true grounds of legal decisions 
are concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of 
opinions.”47
Does this theory of “law-and-(a subconscious) whatever” make the 
two level account more plausible?  Suppose someone tells you that you 
actually think x, but at a subconscious level, so that you are not actually 
aware that you think x.  Of course, this is an allegation that is not easy to 
refute directly.  I do not think, as some may, that the allegation is nonsensical: 
Joseph Vining has convinced me that it is possible, and even common, 
for us to believe things in an important sense without being fully conscious 
of our beliefs.  Still, you may wonder how this person knows what you 
are thinking better than you yourself do.  And you might naturally be 
skeptical if, as in the Holmesian hypothesis, your conscious reasoning is 
supposedly pretty much empty and indeterminate, so that it is the 
subconscious level of thought that gives your decisions whatever 
rationality and predictability they enjoy.  After all, the subconscious has 
typically not been thought to be the home of heightened rationality: 
rather the reverse. 
I admit that it may be gratifying to suppose that, like idiot savants, you 
and I can actually perform economic calculations, or similarly abstruse 
reasonings in moral philosophy, instinctively or intuitively.  “Sure, Kip 
Viscusi and John Finnis are pretty smart guys.  They produce some fancy 
displays of reasoning.  But big deal!  I can do that stuff in my sleep—or 
at least without even thinking about it.”  It might be pleasant to believe 
this.  Pleasant, but is it plausible? 
Actually, this is not a purely rhetorical question.  There are both 
evolutionary and religious accounts of how we might be able to make 
policy or moral judgments intuitively, and I myself am sympathetic to 
such an account for what we usually though unfortunately call “moral” 
judgments.  So let us suppose that the two-faced account of law is 
correct as a descriptive matter: What would that conclusion mean for 
law as a normative institution? 
I think the answer cannot be a happy one.  Because even if law has 
been rescued by “law-and” from suspicions of indeterminacy, it now 
stands open to a more serious charge: namely, of rampant dishonesty.  
Lawyers and judges are complicit, it would seem, in a systematic 
 46. Holmes, supra note 9, at 466-68. 
 47. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 21 (3d ed. 1986). 
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conspiracy to deceive the public about how legal decisions are actually 
made.  Even while giving what appears to be an elaborate and sophisticated 
apology for law, Ronald Dworkin obliquely suggests as much.  Thus, in 
arguing for a “moral reading” of the Constitution in which constitutional 
decisions are driven by moral philosophy⎯not merely by the sorts of 
considerations actually evident in judges’ opinions, such as text or 
original meaning or precedent⎯Dworkin suggests that all judges 
necessarily engage in this sort of interpretation: those who do not 
confess to doing so are guilty of a “costly mendacity.”48  But of course 
this accusation would extend to nearly all judges, because not many 
admit to interpreting the law on the basis of moral philosophy.  So it 
would seem that mendacity on a massive scale is at the heart of the legal 
enterprise. 
Suppose Dworkin is right, though.  In that case, it is understandable 
that lawyers and judges might be reluctant to admit their “mendacity,” 
even (or especially) to themselves.  So maybe they are deceiving themselves 
along with the public.  The suspicion would fit well with the theory, 
noted a moment ago, that lawyers and judges perform their policy or 
philosophical reasoning at a subconscious level, and hence are not aware 
of what they are doing.  Perhaps this conjecture furnishes them with an 
excuse.  But if we are assessing not the personal integrity of judges but 
rather the moral attractiveness of the legal enterprise, that excuse does 
not help much.  If the implicit (and sometimes explicit) charge against 
the legal profession is that “you are systematically deceiving the public,” 
the defense that “we are systematically deceiving ourselves, too” seems 
poorly calculated to elicit much admiration. 
Indulge me in another overdrawn analogy.  Suppose that you live in a 
deeply astrological culture in which it is generally believed that the 
configurations of the stars give wise guidance about how to conduct 
human affairs.  You are a precocious person, so you attend the best 
astrology schools, graduate with honors, earn your astrology license, and 
make partner in a “blue-chip” astrology firm.  Gradually, though, you 
come to believe that the stars are mindless globes of superheated gas 
oblivious of human concerns, and that practical decisions would be 
much better made on the basis of cost-benefit analyses.  What do you 
do? 
 48. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 37 (1996). 
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For a while, perhaps you learn to do cost-benefit analyses in secret and 
to dress up your arguments in astrological jargon when talking to others.  
When you are in this mode, you find it convenient that astrological 
“science,” while presenting itself as solid and determinate, is in fact 
quite vacuous: its indeterminacy allows you to package just about any 
cost-benefit calculation you might make in astrological terms. 
But eventually you realize that you are not uniquely insightful: many 
people (maybe even most) have come to perceive the emptiness of 
astrology and the superior rationality of cost-benefit approaches.  Many 
have been resorting to the same two-faced stratagem that you have been 
using.  Now what to do?  Well, because you happen to belong to the 
astrologers’ guild, you and your fellows might try to carry on for a time 
using the two-faced approach.  Perhaps that is the only way to maintain 
your guild’s beneficent influence in society.  But this would be a deeply 
compromised and unstable project, and one in which you could hardly 
feel proud to participate.  And as the rest of society comes to understand 
what you understand, it is hard to imagine that the charade could 
continue. 
For a while, astrology might survive, with its mindlessness and pervasive 
deception persisting as an “open secret” that everyone understands but is 
not quite ready to own up to publicly.  But you would have an impending 
sense that things cannot continue in this way.  Astrology, you might say, 
“is threatened with collapse.”  So the “death of astrology” would seem 
imminent. 
V. RECOGNITION DISCOURSE 
So, is this our situation in law today?  It might be, and if so, we could 
understand why legal thinkers throughout the last century believed that 
law could not go on in anything like its traditional form.  But on this 
view, it becomes harder to explain why all the prophecies have gone 
perpetually unfulfilled.  Why are the prophets of law’s demise always 
wrong, as it seems they have been?  Why does law persist, and even 
flourish? 
Perhaps the two-faced, “law-and” account of law has misconceived 
the enterprise, and has given the wrong response to the diagnoses of 
indeterminacy.  But how?  And what other responses might be possible? 
One tempting response would repudiate “law-and” and deny the 
necessity of what follows the “and.”  More affirmatively, it would assert 
the sufficiency and autonomy of law—of the formal legal reasoning that 
the “law-and” proponents found insufficient and tried to supplement 
with economics or moral philosophy or whatever.  So it would deny that 
what Holmes called “the fallacy of logical form” is a fallacy after all.  In 
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this spirit, over the last ten years or so we have seen a resurgence of 
legal thinkers who proudly embrace what used to be an epithet—
“formalism.”  The basic idea is to assert that legal decisions are, or at 
least could be and should be, determined by the kinds of legal reasoning 
presented on the face of lawyers’ briefs and judges’ opinions: textual 
arguments, deductions from announced doctrines, and so forth. 
The appeal of this “law is enough” formalism is understandable, I 
think, but I also doubt that the formalist strategy will prove satisfactory 
for very long.  After all, the indeterminacy arguments of the Legal 
Realists and Crits generated the massive enterprise of “law-and” 
precisely because the arguments were, and are, powerful on their face.  
Once again, the very existence of respectable-looking legal briefs on 
both sides of the central questions in most cases is powerful evidence 
that the purely formal resources of legal reasoning often fail to generate 
determinate conclusions. 
So, are there other alternatives?  Well, here is a thought, or at least a 
tentative and preliminary proposal.  But as a starting suggestion, I 
wonder whether we may have been pointed in wrong directions by the 
overtones of the very notion of legal “reasoning.”  Reasoning connotes 
something deductive⎯the kind of thinking we associate with logic or 
maybe proofs in geometry⎯and even if we acknowledge that in subjects 
like law “reasoning” will not lead to certainties but more to probabilities,49 
the term still suggests a deductive or quasi-deductive enterprise.  There 
are premises, and there are conclusions derived from premises.  But it 
seems to me that in life, much of our talk, including talk that is designed 
to be deliberative or persuasive, does not work in this way.  Rarely do 
we actually reason deductively and even when we do, the deductive 
logic is typically a post hoc affair—an exercise we use to test or rationalize 
or support conclusions reached in other ways. 
So then how does deliberation work?  It seems to me that our 
deliberative discourses often consist more of what we might call 
“assisted recognition.”  The assumption is that we already in some sense 
know something, but we do not currently recall it.  Or we do not recall it 
in the vivid sense necessary to see its relevance to our present question.  
Deliberative discourse consists of efforts to bring this tacit knowledge 
 49. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 35, at 17 (“I see no absolute certainty of 
outcome in any aspect of legal life, and think that no man should ever have imagined that 
any such thing could be, or could be worth serious consideration.  Instead I see degrees 
of lessening uncertainty . . . .”). 
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more fully to consciousness so that it can be appreciated, and so that its 
relation to the present question can be recognized. 
There are many, many examples of this sort of discourse.  Some of 
them are quite mundane or even trivial.  We engage in recognition functions 
in games—for example, the guessing game, or charades.  Or maybe we 
are trying to remember something, a song, perhaps, so that I remember 
and sing a line or two and this brings the whole song back to your 
memory.  Or it might be a joke: “How does that one go, the one about 
the farmer and the pig?”  In each case, there is discourse designed to 
help someone recognize the answer to a particular question.  But the 
discourse does not consist of deducing conclusions from premises.  
Rather it consists of hints, fragments, partial descriptions, aimed to help 
someone retrieve and recognize something they already in some sense 
know. 
Nor is recognition discourse limited to recollection, at least in any 
ordinary sense.  Suppose you go to a travel agent and say, “My spouse 
and I are going to celebrate our twenty-fifth anniversary, and we’d like 
to take a trip to some place really special, just right for the occasion.  But 
we can’t think where.  Do you have any suggestions?” 
The agent might reply with some suggestions that consist of abbreviated 
descriptions. 
“Hawaii?” 
“Well . . . maybe.  That would be fun.” 
“Paris?” 
“I don’t know.  Paris would be romantic, but . . . .” 
“How about Rome?” 
“Ah, Rome.  That would be perfect—just what we were looking for.” 
In this conversation, the agent has engaged in a kind of discourse that 
has helped you deliberate, and has “persuaded” you to adopt a particular 
decision.  But the discourse is hardly deductive in nature.  Rather, it has 
helped you bring to mind, and to recognize as the answer to your 
question, something you already knew at some level.  Of course, it might 
be that merely reciting the names of places would be insufficient.  The 
travel agent might need to fill out the descriptions somewhat: “Palm 
trees, beaches, volcanoes.”  The talk might get quite detailed, supplemented 
by brochures and pictures.  And it might be partly propositional in form: 
“There’s a wonderful little restaurant—and not so expensive—just a 
short walk from the Colosseum.”  It might be that you have never actually 
been to Hawaii or Paris or Rome.  Nonetheless, you know something about 
them and you have an image of what they are, and the travel agent’s 
suggestions help to bring them to consciousness so that an image is present.  
You can see the image that seems to be an answer to your question. 
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Suppose someone were to object, after listening to this conversation, 
that the travel agent’s suggestions were utterly indeterminate: “Sure, he 
said some things and then you chose Rome.  But he said things that 
could just as easily have supported Paris, or Hawaii.  You say⎯you may 
even think⎯that you were influenced to choose Rome by what the travel 
agent said to you.  But it is obvious that all of that talk was just 
cosmetic, for public presentation, and you actually chose Rome based on 
something else.”  How cogent would this criticism be? 
I suggest that if we pay attention, much or even most of what we say 
when we are trying to deliberate or to persuade each other is of this 
“recognition discourse” variety.  Rarely do we actually cause people to 
deduce conclusions from premises in any formal way.  Rarely are the 
considerations we urge on people “determinate.”  But we do not think 
that this lack of deductive determinacy is a shortcoming that makes our 
discourse empty.  Nor do we infer from the indeterminacy of our discourse 
that what we say is a mere facade and that something else must really be 
driving the decisions.  Recognition discourse is not “two-faced” but 
rather what we might call “partial featured”; it consists of hints, suggestions, 
partial descriptions, that point us to things we already in some sense 
know.  Our discourse is not a complete description of those things that 
we eventually accept as the answers to our questions.  But the discourse 
is nonetheless about those things; it is not merely a facade for something 
different (the “real reasons”) that drive our decisions. 
VI. REAL LAW? 
If you accept my suggestion that much of our deliberative and 
persuasive discourse is of this “recognition” variety, then questions 
promptly follow.  Why is it that “recognition” discourse seems so little 
recognized as a legitimate kind of reasoning?  And what if anything does 
any of this have to do with law? 
These are hard questions, and I can only offer a few tentative thoughts 
in response.  First, anyone could readily grant that “recognition”⎯and the 
processes by which human beings “recognize”⎯presents an important 
and fascinating subject.  However, the subject might seem to be within 
the domain of cognitive psychology, not of philosophy or of jurisprudence.  
Philosophers, ideally at least, want to know truth, or at least to consider 
how we can apprehend truth, so they study logic and epistemology.  But 
how could the psychological processes that produce recognition provide 
any epistemic credentials to the beliefs we come to hold? 




To be sure, on older, Platonic assumptions, knowledge has sometimes 
been viewed as a kind of recollection.50  But if you think with Locke that 
the mind is a tabula rasa, or if you hold the modern or post-modern 
view that order and value are constructed or imposed, then it is not so 
clear how “recognition” could provide any indicia of truth, or rational 
acceptability. 
This reservation seems particularly powerful with respect to law, at 
least on modern views.  Put it this way: the notion that “recognition” 
could play a central role in the acquisition of truth seems to presuppose 
that (a) there is something real “out there”⎯or at least something that 
exists independent of our opinions about it⎯that is the subject of some 
question we have; and (b) we already have some at least dim or 
submerged knowledge of that something, whatever it is.  On these 
assumptions, the hints and partial descriptions that make up recognition 
discourse might help point us to that object of our inquiry.  We might 
then retrieve and contemplate the object more deliberately and come to 
perceive how it provides the answers to the questions we are asking.  
Thus, if “law” in some sense existed independent of our talk about law, 
then it is just conceivable that law-talk would properly be viewed as a 
sort of halting, partial description seeking to bring that object—the 
law—into clearer view, so that we could see how particular legal 
questions should be answered.  The “weird” or “exotic” law-talk might 
be not so much like premises supporting a deduction as like the snatches 
of a song that help us recall the whole song (or at least a stanza or two) 
which we can then apply to the case at hand. 
Conversely, if law is not in any sense “real” independent of us, that is, 
if it is purely man-made or conventional, then it is harder to see how 
law-talk could be serving this function.  So then it would seem that our 
alternatives would be more limited.  Law-talk—legal reasoning and 
justification—could be formal and deductive.  Or else it might be a cosmetic 
facade for other forms of reasoning.  What other possibilities exist? 
And here I believe we get to the heart of the modern quandary of law 
and legal thought.  In pre-modern or what we might call “classical” legal 
thought, it seems, law was understood to be something real and independent 
of human actors.  Hence, judicial decisions were routinely described not 
as “of themselves, laws,” as Joseph Story put it, but rather as “evidence” 
of law—of something real that transcended them.51
 50. The claim that knowledge is recollection is developed in Plato’s dialogue 
Meno.  See PLATO, Meno, in MENO AND OTHER DIALOGUES 97, 123 (Robin Waterfield 
trans., 2005). 
 51. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842) (emphasis added).  For a learned and 
helpful discussion of this view, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., Judicial Precedent in the Late 
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century, AVE MARIA L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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It is far beyond the scope of this lecture, and even farther beyond my 
competence, to elaborate in just what sense law was thought to be real.  
For now I hope it is sufficient to say that law was viewed as part of 
God’s providential scheme for the cosmos.  Probably the most complete 
and important account of this view was given by Thomas Aquinas, but 
the view was reiterated in abbreviated form by legal thinkers through the 
centuries, from Fortescue to St. Germain to Coke to Blackstone. 
No doubt this view raises lots of questions, both about the nature of 
law and about how humans can know the law.  I would not presume to 
say whether there are satisfying answers to all of those questions.  I am 
content to put forward a modest and heavily qualified proposition: the 
classical view at least embraced the presuppositions necessary to accept 
the theoretical possibility that legal reasoning might be a way of 
apprehending⎯of “recognizing”⎯something that actually existed and 
that was responsive to the questions people ask of law.  Robert Gordon 
makes the point colorfully: quoting Richard Hooker’s statement that law 
sits in “the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world,” Gordon 
observes that pre-Holmesian lawyers “had, as they saw it, a direct line to 
God’s mind through their knowledge of the principles of legal science.”52
Things are different today.  Holmes might be taken as the watershed 
thinker who moved us from a classical to a modern view, or at least the 
most vivid expositor of that transition.53  Although Holmes himself 
seems to have found the classical view pretty much incomprehensible, 
he at least perceived its basic contours.  If you read books about law, 
Holmes observed, “it is very hard to resist the impression that there is 
one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any 
Court concerned.”54  The assumption seems to be that there is “a 
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory 
within it unless and until changed by statute . . . .”55  Conventional law-
talk implicitly treats law as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”56  But 
 52. Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013 
(1997) (quoting I RICHARD HOOKER, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in THE WORKS 
OF RICHARD HOOKER 197, 285 (John Keble ed., 7th ed. 1888)). 
 53. For a helpful recent exploration of this transition from a different perspective, 
see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (2006). 
 54. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & 
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. 
 56. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 




in fact this notion was patently “fallacy and illusion,” because nothing of 
the sort exists.57
With few exceptions, twentieth-century legal thinkers followed Holmes 
in this respect.  Sometimes they recognized, at least dimly, what had 
happened.  Karl Llewellyn noted that the classical approach to precedent 
had reflected the fact that for centuries, “law was felt as something 
ordained of God, or even as something inherently right in the order of 
nature,” though he peremptorily dismissed this view as “superstition.”58  
Felix Cohen conceived that the modern task in law was to “redefine 
supernatural concepts in natural terms.”59
As the twentieth century progressed, or declined, few legal thinkers 
gave evidence of even perceiving the framework of presuppositions 
within which they—we—operate.  The possibility of law in the classical 
sense hardly even occurs to us anymore.  It is hard for us even to 
conceive of what such a law could be, and so we are naturally suspicious 
that anyone ever did have a satisfying conception of such a law: hence 
the seemingly irresistible resort to “law-and.” 
But a two-faced “law-and” account is an unhappy and unstable resting 
place, for reasons I have noted earlier.  And so it has seemed to those 
who bothered to think about the situation that this awkward marriage 
cannot continue.  The “law” side of the “law-and” must somehow be 
transformed, must give way to policy science, or “constructivist” legal 
discourse, or a more overt use of moral philosophy, or something more 
discernibly rational. 
VII. WHERE AND WHITHER? 
Hence the recurring predictions of law’s demise.  In our times, law is 
always on the verge of dying, or of being “overcome,” or superseded by 
something bold and new and more palpably rational.   
And yet . . . law does not have the decency to just die.  Instead, it remains 
as vigorous as ever.  What to make of this inconsiderate persistence? 
In the final chapter of Law’s Quandary I discuss some possible 
diagnoses, but the most eligible candidates, I think, boil down to two.60  
It might be that conventional law-talk is a holdover—a vestige of a 
world view that is no longer plausible, and is barely even entertainable.  
Law is a remarkably tenacious holdover, clinging to life and indeed 
apparently flourishing long after it was supposed to have died.  Because 
 57. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 532-34. 
 58. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 43 (1951). 
 59. Cohen, supra note 12, at 830. 
 60. SMITH, supra note 24, at 157-70. 
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earlier predictions of its demise have repeatedly fallen flat, we should 
probably be careful in our forecasts.  But law-talk is a holdover nonetheless, 
and destined for eventual extinction. 
Or it might be that, in some sense and at some level, we tacitly believe 
or are committed to believing more than we think or admit we believe.  
The “brooding omnipresence in the sky” that Holmes mocked is a 
metaphor, of course, but maybe it is a metaphor for something that is not 
so unthinkable after all.  Maybe law-talk is a way of bringing us to some 
sort of recognition of that omnipresence.  And maybe theorizing about 
law is a kind of exploration that, as Joseph Vining has repeatedly 
proposed, searches for something (or someone) with an authority that we 
did not construct,61 and maybe, to borrow now from T. S. Eliot, “the end 
of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the 
place for the first time.”62
Just to keep us guessing, or to be grand or perhaps perverse, Holmes 
said this too: 
The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it 
universal interest.  It is through them that you not only become a great master in 
your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the 
infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.63
If this more mystical Holmes was right, then the sequel to a lecture on 
“The (Always) Imminent Death of the Law” might be something like “The 
Eternal Return of Natural Law.”  But somebody else will have to give that 









 61. See JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986); 
JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP (1995). 
 62. T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 138, 145 
(1952). 
 63. Holmes, supra note 9, at 478. 
 64. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS 
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 295 (1960). 
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